Miracles: Library Edition

Rating:
Summary: Probably the best argument ever in favor of Christianity
Review: Not the best place to start if you don't consider yourself to be a first-rate thinker (Lewis' own _Mere Christianity_ offers some of the same arguments on an easier-to-digest level)... but if you're up to the challenge, I cannot recommend a stronger argument in favor of a fully supernatural Christian philosophy. NOT an attempt to explain the whole thing away as an allegory, as many so-called "apologists" do. NOT an attempt to use the Bible as a starting place, as many so-called "apologists" do. Lewis begins with only one assumption--one that every thinker uses for every theory ever attempted on any subject--and from that position carefully weaves the most detailed and skillful argument in my experience showing the existence and character of God. An extremely challenging book, especially for sceptics of Christianity, but one which they owe themselves to read (if nothing else, it will increase their faith in their own position and strengthen their mental habits!) This is the book which got me through college; and, next to the Bible itself, the most important book I've ever read. Note: if possible, order an edition printed after 1960, as the late 1940s edition contains a few logical errors which were later corrected. If you need help understanding the book or its arguments, feel free to e-mail me at the address above (flamemail, though, will be promptly deleted... honest criticisms will be attended to.) Good books to read after completing _M:aPS_... the New Testament itself (New American Standard or New International Version is probably best); Lewis' _Mere Christianity_; and then Lewis' _The Problem of Pain_.

Rating:
Summary: A Brilliant Preliminary Examination of Miracles
Review: The acclaimed logic of C.S. Lewis displayed in _Miracles: A Preliminary Study_ reveals much more than the author's genius. Intended to examine the great crux of Christianity, miracles, Lewis also contributes a relevant and thorough view of God and nature.

Lewis first proposes two basic attitudes towards the natural world: (1) Naturalism - a worldview that suggests a closed natural system. "Any reality beyond what can be perceived by the five senses lacks plausability" (Duriez, 2000). (2) Supernaturalism - a worldview that views the universe as a dependent creation of God. "Time, space, and geometry are all God's creation, and these only exist now because he chose to make them out of nothing" (Duriez, 2000).

Ultimately, Lewis concludes, "if naturalism is true, miracles are impossible. If supernaturalism is true, miracles are possible and, indeed, to be expected" (Duriez, 2000).

Much of Lewis' background in his study of miracles originated in the attention he gave to _Theism and Humanism_, the Gifford Lectures for 1914.

Readers should understand that Lewis wrote _Miracles_ as a preliminary examination based on his own incomplete research and thoughts on God and nature. Therefore, the book should never be criticized for its loose ends. It stands as one of the most thoughtful and thorough treatises of the concept.

Rating:
Summary: Argumentum ad Ignorantiam and reply to Micah Newman
Review: The late professor of Medieval and Renaissance literature at Cambridge University, C. S. Lewis wrote his Christian apologetics in a popular style. In his book on miracles, he states that "logical thinking--Reason--had to be the pivot of the argument." Indeed, in chapter three, "The Cardinal Difficulty of Naturalism," he depends so completely on the contention that human reason can only be explained by invoking the supernatural that he bets the farm upon it. I will also briefly repond to Micah Newman's review in which he attempts to rebut my observations of difficulties in Lewis's argument.

What Lewis points out is that a belief caused by a "logical consequent from a ground" is an entirely different cause than the "non-rational causation" to which Naturalism is supposedly limited for giving explanations of events in the world and in people's heads. Moreover, he explains that a physical cause is not a valid ground for an inference. For example, we do not consider as valid the conclusion that unicorns are real if the evidence for them is the experience of someone whose brain is chemically dosposed to having hallucinations of unicorns. As Lewis succinctly puts it, "To be caused is not to be proved." Therefore, according to Lewis, the difficulty of explaining rational thought from "non-rational causation" justifies us in concluding that its cause is actually supernatural, thus opening the door to the miraculous. However, his argument suffers from at least three serious problems.

First, although he is right that a logical ground for a belief is not the same kind of cause as "non-rational causation" and although he is also right that a belief being physically caused would not mean that it was proved, it does not follow that having a physical cause would ipso facto prove falsehood.

Secondly, the same argument for the supernatural cause of rational thought may be applied with equal utility to irrational thought. For in both cases, we are equally ignorant of how to give a full account, in terms of "non-rational causation," of the natural brain functions involved. Shall we conclude that our cognitive errors are also caused by the supernatural? If so, then our supernatural source is either unreliable or even malicious--necessary conclusions that will obviously be unwanted by proponents of miracles.

Thirdly, Lewis appeals to our partial ignorance of the mystery of human consciousness and rational thought, and he uses this ignorance to support supernaturalism and the miraculous. Micah Newman contends in his review that I have misunderstood and misrepresented Lewis's argument here. However, for Lewis's case for miracles to not be an appeal to ignorance, there must be examples of faculties of the mind that are not brain-dependent. Neither reason nor moral judgement nor any other function of the mind can be shown not be brain-dependent. As is obvious from books like that of neurologist Richard M. Restak's "The Modular Brain," change the brain and you change the person--even "spiritually."

Moreover, appeals to ignorance cannot prove the existence of the supernatural. For example, it would obviously be erroneous to conclude that the acceleration of a car by merely pressing a small peddle was miraculous just because we were too ignorant of electrical and mechanical functions to explain it from natural causation. By the same token, without knowing everything about the natural functions of the human brain in the process of creating rational thought, we have no rational validity in jumping to a supernatural explanation.

What his book proves, therefore, is not that we now have rational grounds for belief in miracles. What it proves is that miracles have always been believed not on rational grounds but by the faith that "is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen (Hebrews 11:1). For although his argument fails to prove supernaturalism, belief in it nevertheless continues.

Rating:
Summary: Really 4.5 stars
Review: This book by CS Lewis was probably his most philosophical work. As such, it is not a light read at all and would probably prove difficult for beginners who have not been exposed to heavily philosophical material. But for those who want a highly intellectual philosophical discussion of the possibility of miracles, this book is certainly worthy of one's attention.

There are a number of strengths to this book which continue to make the book solidly relevant better than forty years after the revised edition came out. Lewis cuts to the heart of the matter very quickly in asserting that rejection of miracles apriori is a common attitude that at its core, is anti-intellectual. Attempts to base rejection of miracles on probabilities, as Hume tried to do, are philosophically untenable and require a betrayal of basic realities that are universally accepted.

Lewis then systematically dismantles the worldview that tends to most cradle apriori miracle rejection, naturalism. He compellingly shows that naturalism is a worldview that cannot stand up to philosophical scrutiny. Key to Lewis's presentation is his argument that naturalism can be demonstrated to be false in its complete rejection of supernaturalism merely by the reality of reason. Logic and reason of the mind, by themselves, are supernatural acts that cannot be explained or accounted for in nature, as naturalism demands. Supernaturalism, according to Lewis is not only possible, but pervasive since the act of logical thinking itself is supernatural in origin.

Lewis then eloquently argues that the relationship between nature and the supernatural are not hostile, but complementary. In Lewis's view, nature is quite pliable to accommodate and assimilate supernatural acts in ways that do not bring the kind of chaos and randomness that many naturalists believe to be reprehensible relative to the 'invasion' of nature by alleged supernatural acts. Lewis persuasively demonstrates that this concern is bogus.

Once the reality, possibility, and plausibility of miracles has been established philosophically, Lewis moves to classifying the Biblical miracles as either old creation or new creation miracles. Here, readers might be a bit disappointed by the presentation. Those looking for an evidential defense of miracles in general or any specific miracle in particular will not find it here. This is a philosophical presentation that is chiefly concerned with whether miracles are possible and/or probable. It is not an evidential defense of the possibility of any specific miracle. Lewis's central point is that human beings are disinclined towards believing in the inherent possibility of miracles for reasons that are not intellectually honest and calls for a fresh reappraisal of the possibility of miracles with a fresh attitude of open mindedness and a sincere commitment to soberly seek the truth absent bias. On this point, he does very well.

I noted that I thought the book deserved 4.5 stars rather than a full blown 5 stars. There are two main reasons why this is. First, his discussion of the Incarnation, while fascinating, was mostly off topic. The focus of Lewis's discussion was not on the miraculous nature of the Incarnation, but on its meaning to the believer and its relationship to nature. The discussion is good, but in a book on miracles, I found it to be misplaced. Second, and perhaps more crucial, is that Lewis succumbs to the very ad hoc skepticism that he argues so passionately against. Without elaboration, Lewis introduces the idea of 'Hebrew mythology' as being behind at least some of the miracles described in the Old Testament (Jonah and the whale being one). Why Lewis believes that some Biblical miracles are genuine while others are mythological is something he doesn't discuss. But the reader gets the sense that by taking this position, Lewis is caving in to the very kind of apriori rejection he repeatedly and rightly condemns throughout the book. Lewis's central argument is therefore undermined by his own unwarranted and unexplained backtracking from his own position.

But because this slip of reason is confined to only one or two paragraphs of the book, it is a weakness that while noteworthy and unfortunate, is not fatal to his argument. One who remains skeptical about the viability of miracles should consider that Lewis revised this book back in 1960 (in response to the arguments of Anscombe) and to date, there has been no compelling rebuttal to its tenets. Attempts to erect a solid rebuttal have been presented and then systematically refuted as erroneous and mostly illogical. As a result, this book has stood the test of time and remains a compelling argument that should provide great comfort and assurance to those who believe the Biblical miracles on faith, but wonder whether this belief can also be grounded in reason and philosophical argument. It can, and we should expect nothing less from the Creator who not only created nature and supernaturally intervenes in nature, but who also created perfect logic and reason.

Rating:
Summary: Excellent! The thinking man's book on miracles.
Review: This book provides readers with the best defense for the belief in a living Christianity. As a Christian at a secular university Miracles has proven time and again to be a source of comfort and assurance that to be a Christian is not to be lacking in intellect, unreasonable, or close minded. Rather, it is the man (or woman) who is willing to open themselves up to God who is truly to be praised for being intelligent, reasonable, and open-minded because they are responding to God's call to come and reason with Him -- instead of alone. Lewis was just such a man. For this, and for the many wonderful books he has written, he has my admiration and gratitude.

Rating:
Summary: A philosophical defence of miracles
Review: This is the fourth Christian C.S. Lewis book that I have read (the others: Mere Christianity, The Abolition of Man and The Screwtape Letters). This is typical Lewis style; a common sense approach to the writing that makes me imagine Lewis in a conversation saying something like, "Come now, let's be reasonable."

In the introduction, Lewis says what his subject matter will be. He notes that before one can look at historical evidence, one must settle the question philosophically (i.e. whether miracles are possible). If someone is persuaded that miracles, per se, are impossible then no amount of evidence will convince. So, it you are looking for argumentation regarding specific miracles look else (I suggest William Lane Craig; his defence of the Resurrection is the best available).

I think there are better, shorter and more forceful defences of miracles but this book is not too bad. Other places to look for a defence of miracles: The Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics by Norman Geisler and Reasonable Faith by William Lane Craig.

Lewis' first task is to define naturalism (I think he does a muddled job but the gist of it is: the doctrine that the world can be understood in scientific terms without recourse to spiritual or supernatural explanations or that only the physical world [i.e. Nature] exists). Lewis refutes this by showing that immaterial objects exist namely Reason (that is to say both the existence and validity of logic and the part of human beings that performs acts of reasoning) and the existence of morality or ethics (i.e. When somebody suggests that I ought not to sit in his seat in the theatre, he is not simply making an emotional statement, he is saying that I have violated a rule. The fact that the language of ethics, "ought" "should" etc are meaningful shows this).

He deals with the objection that miracles are against the laws of nature or that experience in general is against miracles happening. Lewis also deals with the objection that miracles were believed and wrote about millennia ago because the people were simple-minded, misunderstood the world and lacked modern science. Lewis also deals with the "problem" of language (i.e. the literal "v.s." metaphorical uses). The remaining portion of the book is on different topics...

For example the chapter: Christianity and "Religion", Lewis compares Christianity with pantheism. He says that modern people hold to pantheism because they think it is a sophisticated belief that doesn't have all the old-fashioned mythology et al that theism has. Lewis then goes on to show that merely because pantheism is easy or popular is no reason to accept it as true. In one of his insights, near the end of the chapter he says:

"Man are reluctant to pass over from the notion of an abstract and negative deity to the living God. I do not wonder. Here lies the deepest tap=root of Pantheism and of the objection to traditional imagery. It was hated not, at bottom, because it pictured Him as a man but because it pictured Him as king, or even as warrior. The Pantheist's God does nothing, demands nothing. He is there if you wish for him like a book on a shelf. He will not pursue you." (page 124)

Lewis then looks at the issue of how probable miracles are. He then has a chapter entitled, "The Grand Miracle," which is on the Incarnation, the Resurrection and the Ascension. However, it does not seem to be an argument as such to me, rather it is an explanation and discussion of what the Incarnation is. This is fine, but I don't think this sort of material is appropriate in work that is setting out to DEFEND Christianity rather than simply explain it. He also has a chapter on the general Resurrection.

The book ends with an admonition to keep Naturalism out of our minds. I agree with Lewis that it is defeated as a philosophy; the problem is that it can easily gain a foothold in our minds and before we know we are thinking with naturalistic assumptions.

This is a fairly good book but sometimes I wondered while reading it, "Where are you going with this, Lewis," or, "How is this relevant?"

Rating:
Summary: Best general Christian apologetic of the 20th century.
Review: When evaluating MaPS, it is most important to keep in mind that Lewis was designing a connected argument, not a salad-bar argument. Each chapter builds upon positions taken in previous chapters, even the ones in which he works to clear up some potential misunderstandings. It is a mistake to treat the book as a set of disconnected positions, as I have often seen critics do (pro and con).

So, for example, one prominent oppositional criticism I have seen, treats the chapters on morality and on probability (5 and 13) as being separate attacks by Lewis on philosophical naturalism. But they weren't designed by Lewis to be anything of the sort, and so (naturally |g|) they fail to withstand such misdirected criticism. By the time Lewis has finished chapter 3, he is no longer attempting to argue against naturalism (or atheism, to be more specific--see below), and so does not bother to continue any rigorous argument against it elsewhere.

He makes this especially clear in chp 5: the goal of the chapter is to infer a further characteristic of God (although admittedly he incautiously names the chapter "A Further Difficulty of Naturalism"); the naturalistic position he presents is one he admits can be logically self-consistent (even if no naturalist ever follows it consistently); and he ends the chapter by saying that his discussion of morality offers no weight as to the question of whether miracles ever occur. In short, this is not a separate theistic Argument from Morality.

Again, with the 13th chapter, the goal is _not_ to argue a weakness of naturalistic philosophy (nor to broadbase refute Hume, btw); but to consider the principles of probability estimation with an eye to discerning what _kind_ of probability estimate, based on what grounds, would be best for judging claims of the miraculous. Both chapters are attempting something very much more subtle and restricted than Lewis' key argument from chapter 3; and Lewis is doing this, because they are pieces of one developing position.

Lewis ought to have distinguished more carefully between naturalism / supernaturalism and atheism / theism. The distinctions, to his credit, _are_ there in the book; but they require some careful criticism to discern: and critics of MaPS (pro and con) aren't often very careful. |g| Be that as it may, chapter 3 is actually directed toward the refutation of atheism (the Final Fact of reality is non-sentient) rather than, strictly speaking, naturalism (there is one and only one 'level' to reality.) Most atheists happen to also be philosophical naturalists, and at the time(s) of Lewis' writing most were in the habit of calling themselves Naturalists; so he politely accepted the use of the title. With the multi-form division of atheistic theories since then, this leaves a door open to spurious oppositional criticisms of various sorts. ('Lewis is only arguing against "naturalism", not this or that other type of atheism'; 'Lewis is misrepresenting "naturalism" as being too broad for what it actually proposes', etc.)

Also, Lewis gets slightly ahead of himself near the end of chapter 3, when speaking about God in relation to human reason. He has already finished his line of argumentation, and has not yet argued that humans are not themselves the source of their own rationality (that's what he does in some future chapters); and this, combined with a clumsy unannounced shift back to the more qualified position of chapter 3, has provided ammunition for some terribly uncritical 'criticism' against him.

On the other hand, Lewis has treated the questions of 'hard' and 'soft' determinism (not called such in his book, though) with more deftness than critics have tended to allow. Much weight is often laid, for instance, by critics (pro and con) on his use of Haldane's refutation of hard determinism--without noticing that Lewis, in the very next sentence and paragraph, explicitly disavows any gain he might have made by using the reference! In fact, the bulk of chapter 3 is devoted to an analysis of the knottier problems surrounding 'indeterminate' types of 'naturalism'.

Often a critic (pro or con), to save time (or wordcount |g|), will skip straight from Lewis' (own disavowed!) use of Haldane, to the two examples of rebuttal which he anticipates near the end of the chapter. This is a critical mistake, although it isn't as much of one as I used to think. The final gist of Lewis' chapter 3 argument, is that it is equally nonsensical to justify the existence or the non-existence of human justification capability--to prove that proofs do exist, or to prove that proofs don't have to exist--and that atheism ultimately entails one of these two options. Lewis reaches this position through a careful (and difficult-to-follow) analysis of the relationship of cause/effect and ground/consequent categories in relation to human thought. This is not something a critic can afford to ignore, in order to see _why_ Lewis anticipates the two lines of rebuttal attempt. But the anticipated rebuttals do admirably summarize the principles of his argument, I think. At least, I have been amused by the fact that, to date, every oppositional attempt I have seen to refute MaPS chp 3, ends up applying either to one or the other of his anticipated rebuttals! (Without the opponent realizing that he is stepping right into the trap Lewis has set!)

There are some shortcomings to the book: his argument against pantheism could stand to be much clearer (it's there, but diffused throughout several chapters--his main chapter vs. pantheism is really targeted against a variant popular in his youth); and he is a little sneaky about the actual topic of his book (an apology for Christianity).

But overall, he presents the most comprehensive 20th century argument I have found for the metaphysical doctrines of Christianity. He isn't as technically rigorous as other authors have been; but MaPS easily serves as a springboard of principles upon which to base more complex arguments--once the reader has understood what Lewis is doing, and why.